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1.  Introduction
The goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a new interpretation or “theory” of
objective chance, one that lets us be sure such chances exist and shows how they can play the
roles we traditionally grant them. 
My subtitle obviously emulates the title of Lewis’ seminal 1980 paper “A
Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance” – while indicating an important difference in
perspective.  The view developed below shares two major tenets with Lewis’ last (1994)
account of objective chance:
(1) The Principal Principle tells us most of what we know about objective chance;
(2) Objective chances are not primitive modal facts, propensities, or powers, but rather
facts entailed by the overall pattern of events and processes in the actual world.  
But it differs from Lewis’ account in most other respects.
Another subtitle I considered was “A Humean Guide ...”  But while the account of
chance below is compatible with any stripe of Humeanism (Lewis’, Hume’s, and others’), it
presupposes no general Humean philosophy.  Only a skeptical attitude about probability itself
is presupposed (as in point (2) above); what we should say about causality, laws, modality
and so on is left a separate question.  Still, I will label the account to be developed “Humean
objective chance”.
2.  Why a new theory of objective chance?
Why have a philosophical theory of objective chance at all, for that matter?  It
certainly seems that the vast majority of scientists using non-subjective probabilities overtly
1Sober ((2004) advocates his no-theory theory on grounds of the severe shortcomings
of the traditional views.  About these shortcomings we are in full agreement; but I hope to
provide, below, an alternative with none of those shortcomings.
2See Hájek (2003).
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or covertly in their research feel little need to spell out what they take objective probabilities
to be.  It would seem that one can get by leaving the notion undefined, or at most making
brief allusions to long-run frequencies.  The case is reminiscent of quantum mechanics, which
the physics community uses all the time, apparently successfully, without having to worry
about the measurement problem, or what -- in the world -- quantum states actually represent. 
Perhaps a theory is not needed; perhaps we can think of objective probability as a theoretical
concept whose only possible definition is merely implicit. Sober (2004) advocates this no-
theory theory of objective probabilities.  
I find this position unsatisfactory.  To the extent that we are serious in thinking that
certain probabilities are objectively correct, or “out there in the world”, to the extent that we
intend to use objective probabilities in explanations and predictions, we owe ourselves an
account of what it is about the world that makes the imputation and use of certain
probabilities correct.  Philosophers are entitled to want a clear account of what objective
probabilities are, just as they are entitled to look for solutions to the quantum measurement
problem.1
The two dominant types of interpretation of objective probability in recent years are
propensity interpretations and hypothetical or long-run frequency interpretations.  Propensity
interpretations come in a wide range of flavors (as Gillies (2000) shows), and not all of them
involve deep modal/causal/metaphysical implications.  For example, some philosophers who
advocate the theoretical term/implicit definition approach may be happy to characterize the
probabilities we find in science, in some cases at least, as propensities.  For the purposes of
this paper, I will however restrict the term “propensity” to the metaphysically robust, causally
efficacious dispositional sort of property postulated by some philosophers’ accounts of
objective chance.
 The difficulties of propensity and long-run frequency views are well enough known
not to require much rehearsal here.2  My own view of these problems is that the hypothetical
frequency interpretation is metaphysically and epistemologically hopeless unless it includes
3 D. H. Mellor’s The Facts of Causation (Mellor [1994]) contains an extended and thorough
exposition and defense of a theory of causation based on a propensity view of objective
chance.
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some account of what grounds the facts about hypothetical frequencies. (Such an account
tends to end up turning the interpretation into one of the other standard views: actual
frequency, subjective degree of belief, or propensity.)   And propensity views, while still
actively pursued by many philosophers, add a very peculiar new sort of entity, property, or
type of causation to the world.3  One can argue at length about whether or not this makes
propensities metaphysically hopeless.  I think it more clear that propensities are
epistemologically hopeless (i.e., one can only claim that statistics are a reliable guide to
propensities via arguments that are all, in the end, invalid – usually, circular).  In section 5.2 a
closely related problem for propensity views of chance will be discussed: their inability to
justify Lewis’ Principal Principle.  For now I will just register my dissatisfaction with both
hypothetical frequency and propensity views of chance; those who share at least some of my
worries will hopefully agree with me that a third way obviating at least some of their
problems would be worth spelling out.
Of course, a third way not suffering from any of the problems alluded to above is
already available: the actual frequency interpretation (sometimes called “finite frequency”). 
The defects of this view are usually vastly overestimated, and its virtues underappreciated. 
Indeed, the actual frequency interpretation is the only natural starting point for an empiricist –
or skeptical – approach to objective chance.  Both Lewis’ (1994) theory and the theory
sketched below are in a sense “sophistications” of the actual frequency approach.  They try to
fit better with common sense, with certain uses of probability in sciences such as quantum
mechanics and statistical mechanics, and with classical gambling devices.  But the grounding
of all objective chance in matters of actual (non-modal, non-mysterious) fact is shared by all
three approaches.
The goal of this paper is thus to develop and defend a “third way” (different from
Lewis’ and from standard actual frequentism) among “third way” approaches (neither
propensity- nor hypothetical frequency-based).  The chances to be described here exist –
whether or not determinism is true, and whether or not there exist such things as primitive
propensities or probabilistic causal capacities in nature.  The interpretation can thus be
defended without making any contentious metaphysical assumptions.  The positive arguments
4For a clear recent exposition and defense of Lewis’ approach, see Loewer (2004).
5 Throughout I will follow Lewis in taking chance as a probability measure over a sub-
algebra of the space of all propositions.  Intuitively speaking, the propositions say that a
certain outcome occurs in a certain chance set-up.  Unlike [what many assume about] rational
credence, the probability measure should not be assumed to extend over all, or even most, of
this whole proposition space. Here we need only assume that the domain of Cr includes at
least the domain of Pr and enough other stuff to serve as suitable X’s and E’s.  
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for the view will turn on two points: first, its coherence with the main uses of the notion of
objective chance, both in science and in other contexts; and second, its ability to justify the
Principal Principle.  
3.  Correcting the Subjectivist’s Guide: Lewis’ program, 1980 - 1994
Because Lewis’ approach to objective chance is well-known, it is perhaps best to
introduce his view, and work toward the proper skeptical/Humean view by correcting Lewis’
at several important places.4  
3.1 PP  
As noted above, one of the two shared fundamentals of Lewis’ interpretation and mine is the
claim that the Principal Principle (PP) tells us most of what we know about objective chance.
PP can be written:
Cr(A|XE) = Pr(A) = x
Here “Cr” stands for “credence”, i.e., a subjective probability or degree of belief function. A
is any proposition you like, in the domain of the objective chance or objective probability
function Pr.  X is the proposition stating that the objective chance of A being the case is x, i.e.,
X = “Pr(A) = x”.  Finally, E is any old “admissible” evidence or knowledge held by the agent
whose subjective probability is Cr.5  The idea contained in PP, an utterly compelling idea, is
this: if all you know about whether A will occur or not is that A has some objective
probability x, you ought to set your own degree of belief in A’s occurrence to x. Whatever else
we may say about objective chance, it has to be able to play the PP role. 
Crucial to the reasonableness of PP is the limitation of E to ‘admissible’ information. 
What makes a proposition admissible or non-admissible?  Lewis defined admissibility
completely and correctly in 1980 – though he considered this merely a vague, first-
approximation definition:
6Lewis (1980/6), p. 92.
7It also created mischief in other ways.  For example, in the context of his
“reformulated” PP, which we will see below, it caused Lewis to believe for a long time that
the true objective chances in a world had to be necessary, i.e., never to have had any chance
of not being the case.  This misconception delayed his achievement of his final view by well
over a decade.
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 “Admissible propositions are the sort of information whose impact on credence about
outcomes comes entirely by way of credence about the chances of those outcomes.”6
This is exactly right.  When is it rational to make one’s subjective credence in A
exactly equal to (what one takes to be) the objective chance of A?  When one simply has no
information tending to make it reasonable to think A true or false, except by way of making it
reasonable to think that the objective chance of A has a certain value.  If E has any such
indirect information about A, i.e., information relevant to the objective chance of A, such
information is cancelled out by X, since X gives A’s objective chance outright.
Notice that in the definition of admissibility cited above, there is no mention of past or
future, complete histories of the world at a given time, or any of the other apparatus
developed in Lewis (1980/6) to substitute a precise-looking definition of admissibility in
place of the correct one.  We will look at some of that apparatus below, but it is important to
stress here that none of it is needed to understand admissibility completely.  Lewis’
substitution of a precise “working characterization” of admissibility in place of the correct
definition seems to be behind two important aspects of his view of objective chance that I will
reject below: first, the alleged “time-dependence” of objective chance; second, the alleged
incompatibility of chance and determinism.7
3.2 Time and Chance.   
Lewis claims, as do most propensity theorists, that the past is “no longer chancy”.  If A
is the proposition that the coin I flipped at noon yesterday lands heads, then the objective
chance of A is now either zero or one – depending on how the coin landed.  (It landed tails.) 
Unless one is enamored of the “moving now” conception of time, and the associated view that
the past is “fixed” whereas the future is “open” (as propensity theorists, I argue elsewhere,
8“Time and Chance Propensities” manuscript. Oddly, Lewis rather explicitly
embraces a moving-now and branching-future picture in “A Subjectivist’s Guide”.   He never,
to my knowledge, discusses how such a picture can be reconciled with relativistic physics.
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seem to be)8, there is little reason to make chance a time-dependent fact in this way.  I prefer
the following way of speaking: my coin flip at noon yesterday was an instance of a chance
setup with two possible outcomes, each having a definite objective chance.  It was a chance
event.  The chance of heads was ½.  So ½ is the objective chance of A.  It still is; the coin flip
is and always was a chance event. Being to the past of me-now does not alter that fact, 
though as it happens I now know A is false.
PP, with admissibility properly understood, is perfectly compatible with taking chance
as not time-dependant. It seems at first incompatible, because of the “working characterization”
of admissibility Lewis gives, which says that at any given time t, any historical proposition -- i.e.,
proposition about matters of fact at or before t -- is admissible.  Now, a day after the flip, that
would make -A itself admissible; and of course Cr(A|-AE) had better be zero ((1980/6), p. 98).
But clearly this violates the correct definition of admissibility.  -A carries maximal information
as to A’s truth, and not by way of any information about A’s objective chance; so it is
inadmissible.   My credence about A is now unrelated to its objective chance, because I know that
A is false.  But as Ned Hall (1994) notes, this has nothing intrinsically to do with time.  If I had
a reliable crystal ball, my credences about some future chance events might similarly be
disconnected from what I take their chances to be.  (Suppose my crystal ball shows me that the
next flip of my lucky coin will land “heads”.  Then my credence in the proposition that it lands
“tails” will of course be zero, or close to it.)
Why did Lewis not stick with his loose, initial definition of objective chance?  Why did
he instead offer a complicated “working definition” of admissibility in its place?  One reason, I
think, is that Lewis (1980/6) was trying to offer an account of objective chance that mimics the
way we think of chance when we think of them as propensities, making things happen (or unfold)
in certain ways.  If we think of a coin-flipping setup as having a propensity (of strength ½) to
make events unfold  a certain way (coin-lands-heads), then once that propensity has done its
work, it’s all over.  The past is fixed, inert, and free of propensities (now that they’ve all “sprung”
and done their work, so to speak).  These metaphors are part and parcel of the notion of chance
as a propensity, and oddly enough they seem to have a grip on Lewis too, despite his blunt
rejection of propensities (particularly in (1994)).  We will see further evidence of this below.
 There is a real asymmetry in the amount and quality of information we have about the
9Typically chance setups involve a temporal asymmetry, the “outcome” occurring after
the “setup” conditions are instantiated.  But in no case do the categories of past, present or
future (as opposed to before/after) need to be specified.
10By avoiding the detour, we also avoid potential pitfalls with backward-looking
chances, such as are utilized in Humphrey’s objection to propensity theories of chance (see
Humphreys (2004)).
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past, versus the future.  We tend to have lots of inadmissible information about past chance
events, very little (if any) inadmissible information about future chance events.  But there
need be nothing asymmetric or time-dependent in the chance events themselves.9  Taking PP
as the guide to objective chance illustrates this nicely.  Suppose you want to wager with me,
and I propose we wager about yesterday’s coin toss, which I did myself, recording the
outcome on a slip of paper.  I tell you the coin was fair, and you believe me.  Then your
credences should be ½ for both A and -A, and it’s perfectly rational for you to bet either way. 
(It would only be  irrational for you to let me choose which way the bet goes.)  The point is
just this: if you have no inadmissible information about whether or not A, but you do know
A’s objective chance, then your credence should be equal to that chance – whether A is a past
or future event.  Lewis (1980) derives the same conclusions about what you should believe,
using the Principal Principle on his time-dependent chances in a roundabout way.  I simply
suggest we avoid the detour.10
3.3  The Best System Analysis of laws and chance.  
David Lewis applies his Humeanism/Skepticism about all things modal across the
board: counterfactuals, causality, laws, and chance all are analyzed as results of the vast
pattern of actual events in the world.  This program goes under the name “Humean
Supervenience”, HS for short.  Fortunately we can ignore Lewis’ treatments of causation and
counterfactuals here.  But his analysis of laws of nature must be briefly described, as he
explicitly derives objective chances and laws together as part of a single “package deal”.
“Take all deductive systems whose theorems are true.  Some are simpler, better
systematized than others.  Some are stronger, more informative, than others.  These
virtues compete: an uninformative system can be very simple, an unsystematized
compendium of miscellaneous information can be very informative.  The best system
is the one that strikes as good a balance as truth will allow between simplicity and
8strength. ...  A regularity is a law iff it is a theorem of the best system.” (1994, p. 478)
Lewis modifies this BSA account of laws so as to make it able to incorporate probabilistic
laws:
“. . . we modify the best-system analysis to make it deliver the chances and the laws
that govern them in one package deal.  Consider deductive systems that pertain not
only to what happens in history, but also to what the chances are of various outcomes
in various situations -- for instance, the decay probabilities for atoms of various
isotopes.  Require these systems to be true in what they say about history.  We cannot
yet require them to be true in what they say about chance, because we have yet to say
what chance means; our systems are as yet not fully interpreted. ...  
As before, some systems will be simpler than others.  Almost as before,
some will be stronger than others: some will say either what will happen or what the
chances will be when situations of a certain kind arise, whereas others will fall silent
both about the outcomes and about the chances.  And further, some will fit the actual
course of history better than others.  That is, the chance of that course of history will
be higher according to some systems than according to others. ...
The virtues of simplicity, strength and fit trade off.  The best system is
the system that gets the best balance of all three.  As before, the laws are those
regularities that are theorems of the best system.  But now some of the laws are
probabilistic.  So now we can analyze chance: the chances are what the probabilistic
laws of the best system say they are.” (1994, p. 480)
A crucial point of this approach, which makes it different from actual frequentism, is
that considerations of symmetry, simplicity, and so on can make it the case that (a) there are
objective chances for events that occur seldom, or even never; and (b) the objective chances
may sometimes diverge from the actual frequencies even when the actual “reference class”
concerned is fairly numerous, for reasons of simplicity, fit of the chance law with other laws
of the System, and so on.    My account will preserve this aspect of Lewis’ Best Systems
approach.  Law facts and other sorts of facts, whether supervenient on Lewis’ HS-basis or
not, may, together with some aspects of the HS-basis “pattern” in the events of the world,
11 Lewis points to the success of quantum mechanics as some reason to think that
probabilistic laws are likely to hold in our world.  But a fully deterministic version of
quantum mechanics exists and is growing steadily more popular, namely Bohmian mechanics. 
Suppes (1993) offers general arguments for the conclusion that we may never be able to
determine whether nature follows deterministic or stochastic laws.  
12 Notice that almost no philosophers today would be willing to make a parallel assertion
about causation, namely that it may or may not be “real” in the world, depending on what
view of laws is ultimately right. 
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make it the case that certain objective chances exist, even if those chances are not grounded in
that pattern alone.  Examples of this will be discussed in section 4.
Analyzing laws and chance together as Lewis does has at least one very unpleasant
consequence.  If this is the right account of objective chances, then there are objective
chances only if the best system for our world says there are.  But we are in no position to
know whether this is in fact the case, or not; and it’s not clear that further progress in science
will substantially improve our epistemic position on this point.  Just to take one reason for
this, to be discussed further below: the Lewisian best system in our world, for all we now
know, may well be deterministic, and hence (at first blush) need no probabilistic laws at all.11 
If that is the case, then on Lewis’ view, contrary to what we think, there aren’t any objective
chances in the world at all.
This is a disastrous feature of Lewis’ account, for obvious reasons. Objective
probabilities do exist; they exist in lotteries,  in gambling devices and card games, and
possibly even in my rate of success at catching the 9:37 train to work every weekday.  In
science, they occur in the statistical data generated in many physical experiments, in
radioactive decay, and perhaps in thermodynamic approaches to equilibrium (e.g. the ice
melting in your cocktail).  Any view of chance that implies that there may or may not be such
a thing after all – it depends on what the laws of nature turn out to be – must be mistaken.12 
Or put another way: the notion of “objective chance” described by the view is not the notion
at work in actual science and in everyday life.
It is understandable that some philosophers who favor a propensity view should hold
this view that we don’t know, and may never know, whether there are such things as objective
chances (though it is equally disastrous for them).  It is less clear why Lewis does so.  On the
face of it, it is a consequence of his “package deal” strategy: chances are whatever the BSA
laws governing chance say, which is something we may never be able to know.  But if we (as
I urge) set aside the question of the nature of laws, and think of the core point of Lewis’
13Levi (1983).
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Humean approach to chance, it is just this: objective chances are simply facts following from
the vast pattern of events that comprise the history of this world.  Some of the chances to be
discerned in this pattern may in fact be consequences of natural laws; but why should all of
them be?
Thinking of the phenomena we take as representative of objective chance, the
following path suggests itself.  There may be some probabilistic laws of nature; we may even
have discovered some already.  But there are also other sources of objective chances, that
probably do not follow from laws of nature (BSA or otherwise): probabilities of drawing to
an inside straight, getting lung cancer if one smokes heavily, being struck by lightning in
Florida, and so on.  Only a very strong reductionist would think that such probabilities must
somehow be derivable from the true physical laws of our world, if they are to be genuinely
objective probabilities; so only a strong reductionist bias could lead us to reject such chances
if they cannot be so derived.  And why not accept them?  The overall pattern of actual events
in the world can be such as to make these chances exist, whether or not they deserve to be
written in the Book of Laws, and whether or not they logically follow from the Book.  As we
will see below in sections 4 and 5, they are there because they are capable of playing the
objective-chance role given to us in the Principal Principle.
Suppose we do accept such objective chances not [necessarily] derivable from natural
laws.  That is, we accept non-lawlike, but still objective, chances, because they simply are
there to be discerned in the mosaic of actual events (as, for Lewis, the laws of nature
themselves are).  Let’s suppose then that Lewis could accept these further non-lawlike
chances alongside the chances (if any) dictated by the Best System’s probabilistic laws.  Now
we can turn to the question of whether objective chances exist if determinism is true.
  
3.4  Chance and Determinism.  Lewis considers determinism and the existence of non-trivial
objective chances to be incompatible.  I believe this is a mistake.
In 1986 Lewis discussed this issue, responding to Isaac Levi’s charge (with which I
am, of course, in sympathy) that it is a pressing issue to say how to reconcile determinism
with objective chances.13 In his discussion of this issue ((1980/6), pp. 117 - 121) Lewis does
not prove this incompatibility.  Rather he seems to take it as obvious that, if determinism is
true, then all propositions about event outcomes have probability zero or one, which then
14 HtwLwTw may entail that A has chance 1.  That’s beside the point; if it’s a case of
normal deterministic entailment, HtwLwTw also entail A itself.  And that is carrying information
relevant to the truth of A other than by carrying information about A’s objective chance.
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excludes nontrivial chances.  How might the argument go?  We need to use Lewis’ working
definition of admissibility and his revised formulation of PP, 
(PP2) C(A|HtwTw) = x = Pr(A)
in which Htw represents the complete history of the world w up to time t, and Tw represents the
“complete theory of chance for world w”.  Tw is a vast collection of “history to chance
conditionals”.  A history-to-chance conditional has as antecedent a proposition like  Htw,
specifying the history of world w up to time t; and as consequent, a proposition like X, stating
what the objective chance of some proposition A is.  The entire collection of the true history-
to-chance conditionals is Tw, and is what Lewis calls the “theory of chance” for world w. 
Suppose that Lw are the laws of world w, and that we take them to be admissible.   Now we
can derive the incompatibility of chances with determinism from this application of PP2:
C(A|HtwTwLw) = x = Pr(A)
For determinism is precisely the determination of the whole future of the world from its past
up to a given time (Htw) and the laws of nature (Lw).  But if Htw and Lw together entail A (say),
then by the axioms, Cr(A|HtwTwLw) must be equal to 1 (and mutatis mutandis, zero if they
entail (-A)).  A contradiction can only be avoided if all propositions A have chances of zero or
one. Thus PP2 seems to tell us that non-trivial chances are incompatible with deterministic
laws of nature.
But this derivation is spurious; there is a violation of the correct understanding of
admissibility going on here.  For if HtwLw entails A, then it has a big (maximal) amount of
information pertinent as to whether A, and not by containing information about A’s objective
chance!14  So HtwLw, so understood, must be held inadmissible, and the derivation of a
contradiction fails. 
PP, properly understood, does not tell us that chance and determinism are
incompatible.  But there is another way of thinking of Lewis’ approach to chance that may
explain his assumption that they are incompatible, already alluded to above.  It has to do with
the “package deal” about laws.  Lewis may have thought that deterministic laws are
15Loewer (2000, 2004) has refined and advocated a Lewisian Best Systems account of
chance, and he comes to the same conclusion: determinism can coexist with nontrivial
chances.  
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automatically as strong as strong can be; hence if there is a deterministic best system, it can’t
possibly have any probabilistic laws in its mix.  For they would only detract from the system’s
simplicity without adding to its already maxed-out strength.  
              If this is the reason Lewis maintained the incompatibility, then again I think it is a
mistake.  Deterministic laws may not after all be the last word in strength – it depends how
strength is defined in detail.  Deterministic laws say, in one sense, almost nothing about what
actually happens in the world.  They need initial and boundary conditions in order to entail
anything about actual events.  But are such conditions to form part of Lewis’ axiomatic
systems?  If they can count as part of the axioms, do they increase the complexity of the
system infinitely, or by just one “proposition”, or some amount in between?   Lewis’
explication does not answer these questions, and intuition does not seem to supply a ready
answer either.  What I urge is this: it is not at all obvious that the strength of a deterministic 
system is intrinsically maximal and hence cannot be increased by the addition of further
probabilistic laws.  If this is allowed, then determinism and non-trivial objective chances are
not, after all, incompatible in Lewis’ system.15 Nor, of course, are they incompatible on the
account I develop below. 
3.5  Chance and credence.  Lewis (1980/6) claims to prove that objective chance is a species
of probability, i.e., follows the axioms of probability theory, in virtue of the fact that PP
equates chances with certain ideal subjective credences, and it is known that such ideal
credences obey the axioms of probability. 
“A reasonable initial credence function is, among other things, a probability
distribution:  a non-negative, normalized, finitely additive measure.  It obeys the laws
of mathematical probability theory. . . .   Whatever comes by conditionalizing from a
probability distribution is itself a probability distribution.  Therefore a chance
distribution is a probability distribution.”  (1980/6, p. 98).  
This is one of the main claims of the earlier paper justifying the title ‘A subjectivist’s guide
...’  But it seems to me this claim must be treated carefully. Firstly, ideal rational degrees of
16 Setting aside worries that may arise when the actual outcome classes are infinite.
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belief are shown to obey the probability calculus only by the Dutch book argument, and this
argument seems to me only sufficient to establish a “ceteris paribus” or “prima facie”
constraint on rational degrees of belief. The Dutch book argument shows that an ideal rational
agent with no reasons to have degrees of belief violating the axioms (and hence, no reason not
to accept any wagers valued in accord with these credences) is irrational if he/she
nevertheless does have credences that violate the axioms.  By no means does it show that
there can never be a reason for an ideal agent to have credences violating the axioms. Much
less does it show that finite, non-ideal agents such as ourselves can have no reasons for
credences violating the axioms.  Given this weak reading of the force of the Dutch book
argument, then, it looks like a slender basis on which to base the requirement that objective
probabilities should satisfy the axioms.
Chances obey the axioms of probability just in case Tw makes them do so.  It’s true
that, given the role chances are supposed to play in determining credences via PP, they ought
prima facie to obey the axioms.  But there are other reasons for them to do so as well.  Here is
one: the chances have, in most cases, to be close to the actual frequencies (again, in order to
be able to play the PP role), and actual frequencies are guaranteed to obey the axioms of
probability.16   So while it is true in a broad sense that objective chances must obey the
axioms of probability because of their intrinsic connection with subjective credences, it is an
oversimplification to say simply  that objective chances must obey the axioms because PP
equates them with (certain sorts of) ideal credences, and ideal credences must obey the
axioms.
Secondly, on either Lewis’ or my approach to chance, it’s not really the case that
objective chances are “objectified subjective credences” as Lewis (1980/6) claims.  This
phrase makes it sound as though one starts with subjective credences, does something to them
to remove the subjectivity (according to Lewis: conditionalizing on HtwTw), and what is left
then plays the role of objective chance.  In his reformulation of the PP, Lewis presents the
principle as if it were a universal generalization over all reasonable initial credence functions
(RICs):
“Let C be any reasonable initial credence function.  Then for any time t, world w , and
proposition A in the domain of Ptw 
17See (1980/6), pp. 110 - 11.  
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[PP2:]       Ptw(A) = C(A|HtwTw).
In words: the chance distribution at a time and a world comes from any reasonable
initial credence function by conditionalizing on the complete history of the world up
to the time, together with the complete theory of chance for the world.” (1980/6, pp.
97-8).
Read literally, as a universal generalization, this claim is just false.  There are some RICs for
which the equation given holds, and some for which it does not, and that is that.  It is no part
of Lewis’ earlier definition of what it is for an initial credence function to be reasonable, that
it must respect PP!  But, clearly, any RIC that does not conform to PP will fail to set
credences in accordance with the equation above.  
PP is of course meant to be a principle of rationality, and so perhaps we should build
conformity to it into our definition of the “reasonable” in RIC.  This may well be what Lewis
had in mind.17 Then the quote from Lewis above becomes true by definition.  Nevertheless the
impression it conveys, that somehow the source of objective chances is to be found in RICs,
remains misleading.  
It is misleading in a second way as well.  The RIC function’s domain presumably
covers all, or nearly all, propositions; so C(A|HtwTw) is a quantity that can be presumed to
exist, in general, for any A.  But Lewis intended (1980/6) to be cautious about the domain of
objective chance, and not to presuppose that it is defined over all propositions (pp. 131 - 2). 
Lewis certainly needs this caution for his laws + chances package strategy, since he can by no
means be certain that objective chances even exist in our world, much less how wide their
domain is if they do.  But this reading of PP2 throws caution to the wind, and makes the
domain of objective chance practically unrestricted.  The reading is a mistaken one.  
Humean objective chances are simply a result of the overall pattern of events in the
world, an aspect of that pattern guaranteed, as we will see, to be useful to rational agents in
the way embodied in PP.  But they do not start out as credences; they determine what may
count as “reasonable” credences, via PP.  In Lewis’ later treatments this is especially clear. 
The overall history of the world gives rise to one true “Theory of chance” Tw for the world,
and this theory says what the objective chances are wherever they exist.  
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 4.  What Humean objective chance is.
So far I have been laying out the Humean view of chance indirectly, by correcting a
series of (what I see as) mistakes in Lewis’ treatment.  Now let me give a preliminary, but
direct, statement of the interpretation I advocate.  This approach has much in common with
Lewis’ as amended above – but without the implied reductionism to the microphysical.  
4.1 The basic features
Chances are in the first instance probabilities of outcomes conditional on the instantiation of
a proper chance setup, and additionally such probabilities as can be derived from the basic
chances with the help of logic and the probability axioms.  I follow Alan Hájek (2003b) in
considering conditional chance as the more basic notion; the “definition” of conditional
probability,
Pr(A|B) = Pr(A & B)/Pr(B)
is a constraint to be respected, where the unconditional probabilities are well-defined, but it is
no complete analysis of the relationship.  As Hájek reminds us, the probability that I get heads
when I flip a fair coin is 1/2; but the probability that I flip the coin?  Typically, that does not
exist.  It would be better to write the above constraint like this:
to remind ourselves that objective chances must always be conditional on a chance setup. But
where no misunderstanding will arise, the conditionalization on the chance setup may be
omitted for brevity, as it was in sections 1 - 3 above. 
The domain over which the Pr(__|__) function ranges may be quite limited, and is
determined by what the Humean mosaic in our world is like.
Chances are constituted by the existence of patterns in the mosaic of events in the world. The
patterns have nothing (directly) to do with time or the past/future distinction, and nothing to
do with the nature of laws or determinism.  Therefore, neither does objective chance.  
From now on, I will call this kind of chance that I am advocating ‘Humean objective
chance’ (or HOC for short).  But it should be kept in mind that the Humeanism only covers
chance itself; not laws, causation, minds, epistemology, or anything else.  
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 These patterns are such as to make the adoption of credences identical to the chances
rational in the absence of better information, in a sense to be explored below. Sometimes the
chances are just finite/actual frequencies; sometimes they are an idealization or model that
“fits” the pattern, but which may not make the chances strictly equal to the actual frequencies.
(This idea of “fit” will be explored through examples, below and in section 5). 
It appears to be a fact about actual events in our world that, at many levels of scale
(but especially micro-scale), events look “stochastic” or “random”, with a certain stable
distribution over time; this fact is crucial to the grounding of many objective chances.  I call
this the Stochasticity Postulate, SP.  We rely on the truth of SP in medicine, engineering, and
especially in physics.  The point of saying that events “look stochastic” or “look random”,
rather than saying they are stochastic or random, is dual.  First, I want to make clear that I am
referring here to “product” randomness, not “process” randomness (in Earman’s (1986)
terminology).  Sequences of outcomes, numbers and so on can look random even though they
are generated by (say) a random-number generating computer program.  For the purposes of
our Humean approach to chance, looking random is what matters.  Second, randomness in the
sense intended is a notion that has resisted perfect analysis, and is especially difficult when
one deals with finite sequences of outcomes.  Nevertheless, we all know roughly how to
distinguish a random-looking from a non-random-looking sequence, if the number of
elements is high enough.  Our concern at root, of course, is with the applicability of PP.  Sets
or sequences of events that are random-looking with a stable distribution will be such that, if
forced to make predictions or bets about as-yet-unobserved parts of them (e.g., the next ten
tosses of a fair coin), we can do no better than adjust our expectations in accord with the
objective chance distribution. 
Some stable, macrocscopic chances that supervene on the overall pattern are
explicable as regularities guaranteed by the structure of the assumed chance set-up.  These
cases will be dubbed Stochastic Nomological Machines (SNM’s), in an extension of Nancy
Cartwright’s (1999) notion of a nomological machine.  A nomological machine is a stable
mechanism that generates a regularity.  A SNM will be a stable chance set-up or mechanism
that generates a probability (or distribution).  The best examples of SNM’s, unsurprisingly,
are classical gambling devices: dice on craps tables, roulette wheels, fair coin tossers, etc.  For
these and many other kinds of chance set-up, we can, in a partial sense, deduce their chancy
behavior from their set-up’s structure and the Stochasticity Postulate.  Not all genuine
18Two comments on this. First, “well-defined” does not necessarily mean non-vague.
“A fair coin is flipped decently well and allowed to land undisturbed” may be vague, but
nevertheless a well-defined chance set-up in the sense that matters for us (it excludes lots of
events quite clearly, and includes many others equally clearly). 
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objective chances have to be derivable from the SP, however.  We will consider examples of
objective chances that are simply there, to be discerned, in the patterns of events. 
Nevertheless, any objective chance should be thought of as tied to a well-defined
chance set-up (or reference class, as it is sometimes appropriate to say).  The patterns in the
mosaic that constitute Humean chances are regularities, and regularities of course link one
sort of thing with another.  In the case of chance, the linkage is between the well-defined
chance set-up and the possible outcomes for which there are objective probabilities.18
To understand this notion of patterns in the mosaic, an analogy from photography may be
helpful.  A black and white photo of a gray wall will be composed of a myriad of grains, each
of which is either white or black.  Each grain is like a particular “outcome” of a chance
process.  If the gray is fairly uniform, then it will be true that, if one takes any given patch of
the photo, above a certain size, there will be a certain ratio of white to black grains (say 40%),
and this will be true (within a certain tolerance) of every similar-sized patch you care to
select.  If you select patches of smaller size, there will be more fluctuation. In a given patch of
only 12 grains, for example, you might find 8 white grains; in another, only 2; and so on. But
if you take a non-specially-selected collection of 30 patches of 12 grains, there will again be
close to 40% whites among the 360 total grains.  The mosaic of grains in the photo is exactly
analogous to the mosaic of events in the real world that found an objective chance such as,
e.g., the chance drawing a spade in a well-shuffled deck.  In neither case does one have to
postulate a propensity, or give any kind of explanation of exactly how each event (black,
white; spade, non-spade) came to be, for the chance (the grayness) to be objective and real.   
Of course, like photos, patterns in the mosaic of real world outcomes can be much
more complex than this.  There can be patterns more complex and interesting than mere
uniform frequencies made from black and white grains (not to speak of colored grains). 
There may be repeated variations in shading, shapes, regularities in frequency of one sort of
shape or shade following another (in a given direction), and so on. (Think of these as
analogies for the various types of probability distributions found to be useful in the sciences.)
There may be regularities that can only be discerned from a very far-back perspective
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on a photograph (e.g., a page of a high school yearbook containing row after row of photos of
18 year olds, in alphabetical order  -- so that, in the large, there is a stable ratio of girl photos
to boy photos on each page, say 25 girls to 23 boys).  This regularity may be associated with
an SNM – it depends on the details of the case – but in any case, the regularity about boys and
girls on pages is objectively there, and makes it reasonable to bet “girl” if offered a wager on
the sex of a person whose photo will be chosen at random on a randomly selected page.
4.2  Examples
Not every actual frequency, even in a clearly defined reference class, is an objective chance. 
Conversely, not every chance set-up with a definite HOC need correspond to a large reference
class with frequencies matching the chances.  I will illustrate the main features of Humean
objective chances through a few examples, and then extract the salient general features.
1.  Chance of 00 on a roulette wheel.
I begin with an example of a classic gambling device, to illustrate several key aspects of
HOC.  The objective chance of 00 is, naturally, x = 1/[the number of slots].  What
considerations lead to this conclusion?  (We will assume, here and throughout unless
otherwise specified, that the future events (and past events outside our knowledge) in our
world are roughly what we would expect based on past experience).  First of all, presumably
there is the actual frequency, very close to x.  But that is just one factor, arguably not the most
important. (There has perhaps never been a roulette wheel with 43 slots; but we believe that if
we made one, the chance of 00 would be 1/43.) 
 Consider the type of chance set-up a roulette wheel exemplifies.  First we have spatial
symmetry, each slot on the wheel having the same shape and size as every other.  Second, we
have (at least) four elements of randomization in the functioning of the wheel/toss: first, the
spinning (together with facts about human perception and lack of concern) gives us
randomness of the initial entry-point of the ball, i.e., the place where it first touches.  The
initial trajectory and velocity of the ball is also fairly random, within a spread of possibilities. 
The mechanism itself is a good approximation to a classical chaotic system – that is, it
embodies sensitive dependence on initial conditions.  Finally, the whole system is not isolated
from external perturbations (gravitational, air currents, vibrations of the table from footfalls
and bumps, etc.), and these perturbations also can be seen as a further randomizing factor.
19The term “product” randomness is unfortunate, since it seems to imply that the
randomness involved has been produced by some process.  HOC prescinds from any such
assumption.
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The dynamics of the roulette wheel are fairly Newtonian, and it is therefore natural to expect
that the results of spins with so many randomizing factors, both in the initial conditions and in
the external influences, will be distributed stochastically but fairly uniformly over the possible
outcomes (number slots).  And this expectation is amply confirmed by the actual outcome
events, of course.
The alert reader may be concerned at this use of “randomness” and “randomizing”,
when these notions are surely bound up with the notion of chance itself (and maybe, worse, a
propensity understanding of chance).  But recall, for the Humean about chance, all
randomness is product randomness.19  Randomness of initial conditions is thus nothing more
than stochastic-lookingness of the distribution of initial (and/or boundary) conditions,
displaying a definite and stable distribution at the appropriate level of coarse-graining.  The
randomness adverted to earlier in my description of the roulette wheel is just this, a Humean-
compatible aspect of the patterns of events at more-microscopic levels.  Here we see the
Stochasticity Postulate in action: it grounds our justified expectation that roulette wheels will
be unpredictable and will generate appropriate statistics in the outcomes.
2. Good coin flips. Not every flip of a coin is an instantiation of the kind of stochastic
nomological machine we implicitly assume is responsible for the fair 50/50 odds of getting
heads or tails when we flip coins for certain purposes.  Young children’s flips often turn the
coin only one time; flips where the coin lands on a grooved floor frequently fail to yield either
heads or tails; and so on.  Yet there is a wide range of circumstances that do instantiate the
SNM of a fair coin flip, and we might characterize the machine roughly as follows:
1. The coin is given a goodly upward impulse, so that it travels at least a foot upward and
at least a foot downward before being caught or bouncing;
2. The coin rotates while in the air, at a decent rate and a goodly number of times;
3. The coin is a reasonable approximation to a perfect disc, with reasonably uniform
density and uniform magnetic properties (if any);
4. The coin is either caught by someone not trying to achieve any particular outcome, or
is allowed to bounce and come to rest on a fairly flat surface without interference
5. If multiple flips are undertaken, the initial impulses should be distributed randomly
20Sober (2004) discusses a coin-flipping set-up of the sort described here, following
earlier analyses by Keller and Diaconis based on Newtonian physics.  Sober comes to the
same conclusion: if the distribution of initial conditions is appropriately random-looking (and
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over a decent range of values so that both the height achieved and the rate of spin do
not cluster tightly around any particular value.
Two points about this SNM deserve brief comment.  First, this characterization is obviously
vague.  That is not a defect.  If you try to characterize what is an automobile, you will
generate a description with similar vagueness at many points.  This does not mean that there
are no automobiles in reality.  Second, here too the “randomness” adverted to is meant only as
random-lookingness, and implies nothing about the processes at work.  For example, we
might instantiate our SNM with a very tightly calibrated flipping machine that chooses (a) the
size of the initial impulse, and (b) the distance and angle off-center of the impulse, by
selecting the values from a pseudo-random number generating algorithm.  In “the wild”, of
course, the reliability of nicely randomly-distributed initial conditions for coin flips is, again, 
an aspect of the Stochasticity Postulate.20  The diagram below from Diaconis (1998)
in particular, distributed approximately equally between IC’s leading to heads and IC’s
leading to tails), then the overall system is one with an objective chance of 0.5 for heads.
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illustrates this, on a Newtonian-physics model of coin flipping. Initial conditions with T
(angular velocity) and V/g (vertical velocity) falling in a black area land heads; those in white
areas land tails.  (The coins are all flipped starting heads-up.)    From the SP we expect the
initial angular velocities and vertical velocities to be scattered in a random-looking
distribution over the square (not an even distribution, but rather random-looking in the sense
of not having any correlation with the black and white bands).  When this is the case, the
frequency of heads (black bands) and tails (white) will be approximately 50/50.
3. The biased coin flipper.  The coin flip SNM just described adds little to the roulette wheel
case, other than a healthy dose of vagueness (due to the wide variety of coin flippers in the
world).  But the remarks about a coin-flipping machine point us toward the following, more
interesting SNM.  Suppose we take the tightly-calibrated coin flipper (and “fair” coin) and: 
make sure that the coins land on a very flat and smooth, but very mushy surface (so that they
never, or almost never, bounce); try various inputs for the initial impulses until we find one
that regularly has the coin landing heads when started heads-up, as long as nothing disturbs
the machine; and finally, shield the machine from outside disturbances.  Such a machine can
no doubt be built (probably has been built, I would guess), and with enough engineering
sweat can be made to yield as close to chance = 1.0 of heads as we wish.  
This is just as good an SNM as the ordinary coin flipper, if perhaps harder to achieve
in practice.  Both yield a regularity, namely a determinate objective probability of the
outcome heads.  But it is interesting to note the differences in the kinds of “shielding”
required in the two cases.  In the first, what we need is shielding from conditions that bias the
results (intentional or not).  Conditions i, ii, iv and v are all, in part at least, shielding
conditions.  But in the biased coin flipper the shielding we need is of the more prosaic sort
that many of our finely tuned and sensitive machines need:  protection from bumps, wind,
vibration, etc.  Yet, unless we are aiming at a chance of heads of precisely 1.0, we cannot
shield out these micro-stochastic influences completely!  This machine makes use of the
micro-stochasticity of events, but a more delicate and refined use.  We can confidently predict
that the machine would be harder to make and keep stable, than an ordinary 50/50 -generating
machine.  There would be a tendency of the frequencies to slide towards 1.0 (if the shielding
works too well), or back toward 0.5 (if it lets in too much from outside).
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4. The radium atom decay.  Nothing much needs to be said here, as current scientific theory
says that this is a SNM with no moving parts and no need of shielding.  In this respect it is an
unusual SNM, and some will wish for some explanation of the reliability of the machine. 
Whether we can have one or not remains to be seen (though Bohmians think they already
have it - and their explanation invokes the SP with respect to particle initial position
distributions).  Other philosophers will want to try to reduce all objective chances to this sort. 
Whether they can have their way will be the subject of section 6.2
Many Humean objective chances – especially the paradigm cases – will be associable with an
SNM whose structure we can lay out more or less clearly.  But we should expect that many
other Humean chances will not have such a structure.  If they exist, out there in the wild, they
exist because of the existence of the appropriate sort of pattern in actual events.  But the class
of “appropriate” patterns will not be rigorously definable. There will be no clear-cut, non-
arbitrary line that we can draw, to divide genuine objective probabilities on one side, from
mere frequencies on the other.  
5. The 09:37 train.  Let’s assume that there is no SNM that produces a chance regularity (if
there is one) in the arrival time of my morning train.  Is there nevertheless an objective chance
of the 09:37 train arriving within +/- 3 minutes of scheduled time?  Perhaps – it depends on
what the pattern/distribution of arrival times looks like.  Is it nicely random-looking while
overall fitting (say) a nice Gaussian distribution, over many months?  Is the distribution stable
over time, or if it shifts, is there a nice way to capture how it slowly changes (say, over
several years)?  If so, it makes perfect sense to speak of the objective chance of the train being
on time.   On the other hand, suppose that the pattern of arrivals failed to be random-looking
in two significant ways: it depends on day of the week (almost always late on Friday, almost
always on time on Monday, ...), and (aside from the previous two generalizations), the pattern
fails pretty badly to be stable across time, by whatever measure of stability we find
appropriate.  In this case, it probably does not make sense to say there is an objective chance
of the train being on time – even though, taking all the arrivals in world history together, we
can of course come up with an overall frequency.  
When we discuss the deduction of the Principal Principle, we will see why such mere
frequencies do not deserve to be called objective chances. Stability is the crucial notion, even
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if it is somewhat vague.  When there is a pattern of stable frequencies among outcomes in
clearly-defined setups (which will often be called reference classes), then guiding one’s
expectations by the Humean chances (which will either be close to, or identical with, the
frequencies) will be a strategy demonstrably better than the relevant alternatives.
4.3 The Best System of chances
I think Lewis was right to suppose that a Humean approach to objective chance should
involve the notion of a Best System of chances – though not a Best System of laws + chances
together.  Now it is time to say a bit more about this idea. 
 Lewis was able to offer what appeared to be a fairly clear characterization of his Best
Systems, with his global, laws+chances ambitions and his criteria of strength, simplicity and
fit.  Closer inspection destroys the tidiness of Lewis’ theory, however.  We don’t know
whether initial conditions count as one proposition or as infinitely many (nor how to weigh
the reduction of simplicity, whatever answer we give); we don’t know whether deterministic
laws are automatically as strong as can be, or whether instead some added chance-laws may
increase strength at an acceptable price; and as Elga (2004) has noted, the notion of “fit”
certainly cannot be the one Lewis proposed, in worlds with infinite numbers of chance events.
We should retain the three criteria of simplicity, strength and fit – understanding fit as Elga
suggests, as “typicality”– but bear in mind that we are dealing with systems of chances alone,
not laws + chances.  
If Lewis’ characterization of his best systems proved untidy on close inspection, my 
characterization of chance best systems will be visibly untidy from the outset.  But there is a
good justification for the untidiness.  First, the “best” in Best System means best for us (and
for creatures relevantly similar). The system covers the sorts of events we can observe and
catalogue, and uses the full panoply of natural kind terms that we use in science and in daily
life.  Pattern regularities about coins and trains may be found in the Best System, not only
regularities about quarks and leptons.  Since we are not trying to vindicate fundamentalism or
reductionism with our account of chance, but rather make sense of real-world uses of the
concept, there is no reason for us to follow Lewis in hypothesizing a privileged physical
natural-kinds vocabulary.
 For a Humean about chance, what chances exist, how much of the overall mosaic
they “cover” and how well they admit systematization, are all questions that depend on the
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contingent specifics of the universe’s history.  And while we have come to know (we think) a
lot about that history, there is still much that we have yet to learn.  Despite our relative
ignorance, there are some aspects of a Best System for our world that can be described with
some confidence. 
Earlier we discussed roulette wheels and I mentioned that for any well-made wheel
with N slots (within a certain range of natural numbers N), each slot’s number has a
probability of 1/N of winning on each spin.  This is an example of the kind of higher-level
chance fact that we should expect to be captured by the Best System for our world.  It goes
well beyond frequentism, since it applies to roulette wheels with few or zero actual trials, and
it “smooths off” the actual frequencies to make them fall into line with the symmetries of the
wheels.  But still, this chance regularity is just a regularity about roulette wheels.  We can
speculate as to whether the Best System for our world is able to capture this regularity as an
instance of a still-higher-level regularity:  a regularity about symmetrical devices that amplify
small differences in initial conditions and/or external influences to produce (given the SP) a
reliable symmetric and random-looking distribution of outcomes over long sequences of
trials.  Given what we know about the reliability of certain kinds of mechanisms, and the
reliability of the stochasticity of the input/boundary conditions for many such mechanisms,
this seems like a solid speculation.  I would not want, however, to try to articulate a full
definition of such SNMs, which have as sub-classes roulette wheels, craps tables, lottery ball
drums, and so forth.  But we do not have to be able to specify clearly all of the domains of
objective chance, in order to have confidence in the existence of some of them.
The full domain of chance includes more than just gambling devices, however, even at
the macro-level.  There may or may not be an objective chance of the 09:37 train being on
time, but there certainly is (thanks to the biological processes of sexual reproduction) an
objective chance of a given human couple having a blue-eyed child if they have a baby, and
there may well be an objective chance of developing breast cancer (in the course of a year),
for adult women of a given ethnicity aged 39 in the United States.  I say “may well”, because 
it is not automatically clear that in specifying the reference class in this way, I have indeed
described a proper chance setup that has the requisite stability of distribution, syncrhonically
and diachronically.  The problem is well-known:  if there is a significant causal factor left out
of this description, that varies significantly over time or place, or an irrelevant factor left in,
then the required stability may not be found in the actual patterns of events (remember:  over
21As I argue in (2005), “Humean Effective Strategies”, the requisite stability may also
fail just due to statistical “bad luck” - one should not think that presence/absence of causal
factors will explain everything about the actual statistical patterns.
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all history).21  If the required stability is present, though, then there is a perfectly good
objective chance here, associated with the “setup” described.
It may not be the only good objective chance in the neighborhood, however.  Perhaps
there are different, but equally good and stable statistics for the onset of breast cancer among
women aged 39 who have children and breast-feed them for at least  6 months. There is a
tendency among philosophers to suppose that if this objective chance exists, then it cancels
out the first one, rendering it non-objective at best.  But this is a mistake.  The first probability
is perfectly objective, and correct to use in circumstances where one needs to make
predictions about breast cancer rates and either (a) one does not know about the existence of
the second objective probability, or (b) one has no information concerning child-bearing and
breast-feeding for the relevant group.  There is a sense in which the second probability can
“dominate” over the first, however, if neither (a) nor (b) is the case.  PP, with admissibility
correctly understood, shows us this.  Suppose we are concerned to set our credence in 
A: Mrs. K, a randomly selected woman from the New Brunswick area aged 39,
will develop breast cancer within a year.
and we know both probabilities:
X1:  Pr(B. cancer|woman 39, ...) = x1
X2:  Pr(B. cancer|woman 39 & has breast-fed, . . .) = x2, and
       Pr(B. cancer|woman 39 & does not breast-feed, . . . ) = x3
and for the population, we have all the facts about which women have had children and
breast-fed them.  With all of this packed into our evidence E, we cannot use PP in this way:
Cr(A|X1 & E) = Pr(A) = x1
Why not?  Because since our evidence E contains X2, X3, and the facts about which women
have breast-fed children (including Mrs. K),  our evidence contains information relevant to
22How do we know this, the irrelevance of the X1 probability once X2 becomes
available?  It follows directly from the fact that the X2 reference class is a subset of the X1
class, given the justification of PP (see sec. 5).  To anticipate: while the argument justifies
setting credences concerning a (medium-large) number of instances of the X2 setup using the
X2 chance, it would fail if presented as a justification for using the X1 chance to set credences
for a similar number of instances of the X2 setup.
23It might seem that the Best System aspect of our Humean account of chance should
rule out such overlapping chances: the system should choose the best of the two competing
chances.  In this case, that would perhaps mean jettisoning the chance X1 and retaining the X2
chances.  In some cases that may be correct, but not in general.  Considerations of
discoverability and utility (applicability) will often be enough (together with the existence and
stability of the right sort of outcomes in history) to demand the retention of more-general
chances alongside more-specific ones, in the Best System.
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the truth of A, which is not information that comes by way of A’s objective chance in the X1
setup (the one whose invocation we are considering).  So this information is all jointly
inadmissible.  By contrast, we can apply PP using X2, because all our evidence is admissible
with respect to that more refined chance.  Knowing X2, we also know that X1 is not relevant
for the truth of A for cases where we know whether a woman has breast-fed or not.22
What I have done here is similar to the advice that empiricist/frequentists have given
for ages, to set the (relevant) objective probability equal to the frequencies in the smallest
homogeneous reference class for which there are “good” statistics. But we have, hopefully, a
clearer understanding of what “homogeneous” means here, in terms of the chance set-ups that
make it into the best system’s domain; we see that we may be able to apply the objective
chance even if the relevant events form a reference class too small to have good statistics -
namely, if the Humean chance is underwritten by a higher-level pattern that gives coverage to
the setup we are considering; and finally, we see why this advice does not automatically
undercut the claim to objectivity of probabilities for larger, less-homogeneous reference
classes.23
When considering the chances of unpleasant outcomes like cancer, of course, we
would typically like something even better than one of these objective probabilities for setups
with many people in their domain.  We would like to know our own, personal chance of a
certain type of cancer, starting now. The problem is that we can’t have what we want.  There
is good reason to doubt that this objective chance actually exists, in the best system for our
world that an omniscient being would lay out.  Since a given person’s history does not suffice
to ground a chance-making pattern for cancer, for such a chance to exist it would have to be
grounded at a different level, perhaps by reduction to micro-level probabilities.  But even if
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this reductionist objective chance exists as a consequence of the best system, we are never
going to be able to know its value (not being omniscient).  So for the purposes of science, of
social policy, and of personal planning, such individualized objective chances may as well not
exist; and a philosophical account of chance that hopes to be relevant to the uses of
probability in these areas of human life can forget about them. 
Nonetheless, it is true that part of the Best System chances in our world are the
chances given to us by quantum mechanics. Remember: I am entitled to say this, because it
does not hinge on whether determinism is true or false, or on whether there is ultimately some
better, more-fundamental theory for phenomena in our world.  Philosophers who follow
Lewis in either (a) denying the compatibility of chance and determinism, or (b) analyzing
chance + laws together in a big Best Systems package, are not entitled to this claim.  
It is a matter of controversy whether all phenomena whatsoever are covered by
quantum mechanics (including its field theory extensions).  But suppose this were true.  In
section 6.2 we will explore whether we should leap from something like this, to the notion
that every proposition about events has a determined objective chance, because of
supervenience of the macro on the micro.  Before we address this question, we need to see
how PP turns out to be justified – almost “deducible” – from our Humean account of
objective chance.
Summing up: Chances are constituted by the existence of patterns in the mosaic of events in
the world.  These patterns are such as to make the adoption of credences identical to the
chances rational in the absence of better information, if one is obliged to make guesses or bets
concerning the outcomes of chance set-ups (as I will show in section 5.).  Some stable,
macrocscopic chances that supervene on the overall pattern are explicable as regularities
guaranteed by the structure of the assumed chance set-up, together with our world’s micro-
stochastic-lookingness (SP).  These are as close as one can get to the propensity theorist’s
single-case chances, without stepping over the line into nonsense. Not all genuine objective
chances have to be derivable from the SP, however.  The right sort of stability and
randomness of outcome-distribution, over all history, for a well-defined chance set-up, is
enough to constitute an objective chance. Moreover, set-ups with few actual outcomes, but
the right sort of similarities to other set-ups having clear objective chances (e.g. symmetries,
similar dynamics, etc.) can be ascribed objective chances also: these chances supervene on
24Strevens (2002), Hall (2004). 
25Von Mises (1928) insisted on something of this nature, but in order to make it
mathematically tractable in the way he desired, he had to make the unfortunate leap to
hypothetical infinite “collectives”.
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aspects of the Humean mosaic at a higher level of abstraction. The full set of objective
chances in our world is thus a sort of Best System of many kinds of chances, at various levels
of scale and with varying kinds of support in the Humean base.  What unifies all the chances
is their ability to play the role of guiding credence, as codified in the Principal Principle.
5.  Deduction of PP
In this section I will show how, if objective chances are as the HOC view specifies, the
rationality of PP follows.  Lewis claimed: “I think I see, dimly but well enough, how
knowledge of frequencies and symmetries and best systems could constrain rational
credence.” (1994, p. 484)   Recently, Michael Strevens and Ned Hall have claimed that Lewis
was deluding himself, as either there is no way at all to justify PP, on any view of chance
(Strevens), or no way for a Humean to do the job (Hall).24  I will try to prove these authors
mistaken by direct example, offering a few comments along the way on how they went astray.
5.1 Deducing the reasonableness of PP
The key to demonstrating the validity of PP for Humean chances rests on the fact that the
account is a “sophistication” of actual frequentism.  For the purposes of this section, we can
think of HOC as modifying simple actual frequentism by:
A. Requiring that outcomes not only have an actual frequency (or limit, if infinity is
contemplated), but also that the distribution of outcomes “look chancy” in the
appropriate way – stability of distribution over time and space, no great deviations
from the distribution in medium-sized, naturally selected subsets of events, etc.  This
is something a smart frequentist would insist on, in any case.25
B. Allowing higher-level and lower-level regularities (patterns), symmetries, etc. to
“extend” objective chance to cover set-ups with few, or even zero, actual instances in
the world’s history (often with the help of the SP and the notion of an SNM)
C. Anchoring the notion of chance to our epistemic needs and capabilities through the
Best Systems aspect of the account.  
26The limitation most familiar to readers will be the limitation imposed by the
undermining phenomenon, which is this: objective chances cannot be used to guide credence
unrestrictedly, over events of arbitrary “size” within the overall mosaic; their proper use is
restricted to relatively small events or sets of events, small compared to the global patterns. 
See Hoefer (1997) and section 6.1 below.
27For example, it might be that after any two consecutive flips turn up heads, the
frequency of heads on the next flip of the same coin is 0.25, on average, throughout history. 
If this were so, then (depending on how other aspects of the pattern look) we might have a
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D. Insisting that the proper domain of application of objective chances is intrinsically
limited, as we will see in detail in section 6.26   
With these ideas in mind, we can sketch the basic argument that establishes the
reasonableness of PP for Humean chance along what Strevens (1999) calls “consequentialist”
lines.  
PP advises us to set our level of credence in an outcome type A, under setup
conditions S, equal to the objective chance x of A, as long as we have no better (inadmissible)
information to go by.  What we need to demonstrate is that there is an objective sense in
which the recommended level of credence x is better than any other that we might adopt
instead.  Here our assumption is that we are dealing with a simple, time-constant objective
chance of A in the setup S.  Not all objective chances in the Best System need be like this, of
course, but our argument will carry over to less-simple chance laws and distributions more or
less directly and obviously.  Let’s suppose that this is a typical objectively chancy
phenomenon, in the sense that S occurs very many times throughout history, and A as well. 
Then our Humean account of chance entails that the frequency of A in S will be
approximately equal to x, and also that the distribution of A-outcomes throughout all cases of
S will be fairly uniform over time (stable), and stochastic-looking.  If the first (frequency)
condition did not hold, x could not be the objective chance coughed up by the Best System for
our world – world history would undermine any other (significantly different) value.  If the
stability condition did not hold, then either our Best System would not say that there exists an
objective chance of A in S, or it would say that the chance is a certain function of time and/or
place - contrary to our assumption.  If the stochastic-lookingness condition did not hold, then
again either the Best System would not include a chance for A in S, or it would include a more
complicated, possibly time-variable or non-Markovian chance law – contrary to our
assumption.27  
very different, non-Markovian chance law for coin flips; or a special sub-law just for cases
where two flips have come up heads, and so forth. 
28Those who like proofs are referred to Appendix B of Strevens (1999), in which he
proves that following PP is a “winning strategy” in the [medium-] short run if the relative
frequency f of A is close to the objective chance x, where “close” means that f is closer to x
than are “the odds offered by Mother Nature”.  Strevens has in mind a betting game in which
Mother Nature proposes the stakes, and the chance-user gets to decide which side to bet (A, or
¬A). 
Since Strevens maintains that no justification of PP is possible at all, under any theory,
what does he make of this short-run argument for PP in his appendix B?  He views it as a case
of “close, but no cigar” because he thinks that there can be no guarantee that the antecedent
conditions are satisfied, in a chancy world (pp. 258 - 259)  (Like Hall, and most other authors,
he thinks of objective chances as being, like propensity theorists maintain, compatible with
any results whatsoever over a finite set of cases).  Strevens does consider the possibility that
satisfying these conditions might be built in to the definition of chance directly (as, in effect,
is done in Humean chance), but rejects this on the grounds that we then make it much harder
to establish that the objective chances exist at all.  Strevens’ argument here is directed against
a limiting-frequency account rather than a Best Systems account, so his worry does not in fact
apply to the account on offer here.  In effect, by taking objective chances too metaphysically
seriously (i.e., like propensity theorists or hypothetical frequentists do), Strevens ignores the
logical subspace of theories of chance occupied by our Humean best system account.
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Therefore, we know the following: at most places and times in world history, if one
has to guess at the next n outcomes of the S setup, then if n is reasonably large (but still “short
run” compared to the entire set of actual S instances), the proportion of A outcomes in those n
“trials” will be close to x.  And sometimes the proportion will be greater than x, sometimes
less than x; there will be no discernible pattern to the distribution of greater-than-x results
(over n trials) vs less-than-x results; and if this guessing is repeated at many different times,
the average error (sum of the deviations of the proportions of A in each set of n trials from x)
will almost always be close to zero.  Notice that we have made use of the ordinary language
quantifiers “most” and “almost always” here, and we have not said anything about getting
things right “with high probability” or “with certainty, in the limit”, or anything of that nature.
What we have seen so far shows that, if one has a practical need to guess the
proportion of A-outcomes in a nontrivial number of instances of S, then guessing x is not a
bad move.28  Is there a better move out there, perhaps?  Well, yes: it is even better to set one’s
credences equal to the actual frequency of A in each specific set of trials - that way, one never
goes wrong at all.  This is basically the same as having a crystal ball, and we already knew
that guiding one’s credences by a reliable crystal ball is better than any other strategy.  We
can associate this idea with a competitor “theory” of objective chance, which we will call
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“Next-n Frequentism” (NNF).  NNF-chances are clearly very apt indeed for playing the PP
role.  To the extent that they diverge from the Humean chances in value, someone who needs
to predict the next n outcomes would be well advised to set their credences equal to the NNF
chances.  
Unfortunately, unlike Humean chances (which can be discovered inductively, with no
more problem than what Hume’s problem of induction poses for all knowledge), you really
would need a crystal ball to come to know the NNF-chances.  Since no reliable crystal balls
seem to exist, and there is no other way to arrive at this superior knowledge, we can set aside
NNF-chances as irrelevant.  The question for our justification of PP is rather:  is there any
other fixed proportion x’ that would be an even better guess than x?  And as long as the
difference between x’ and x is non-trivial, the answer to this question is going to be, clearly,
“No”.  Any such x’ will be such that it diverges from the actual proportion of A in a set of n
trials in a certain direction (+ or !) more often, overall, than x does.  And its average absolute
error, over a decent number of sets of n trials, will almost always be greater than the average
absolute error for guessing x.  
“Almost always” is not “always”.  It is true that a person might set their credences to
x’, guess accordingly, and do better in a bunch of sets of n trials than an x-guesser does.  PP
can’t be expected to eliminate the possibility of bad luck.  But the fact that most of the time
the x-guesser accumulates less error than the x’-guesser is already enough – enough to show
the reasonableness of PP. As we will see below, this is far more than any competitor theory of
chance can establish.
There are further comments to be made, and loopholes to close off, but the basic argument is
now out in the open.  PP tells you to guess (set your credences) equal to the objective chance;
in general, the Humean objective chance is close to the actual frequency; and setting one’s
credences equal to the actual frequency is better, at most times and places,  than setting them
equal to any other (significantly different) value.  This basic argument raises many questions;
I will address two important ones briefly now.
From n-case to single-case reasonability?  
The basic argument looks at a situation in which we need to guess the outcomes of S setups
over a decent-sized number of “trials”.  But sometimes, of course, we only need to make an
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educated guess as to the outcome of a single “trial” – e.g., if you and I decide to bet on the
next roll of the dice, and then quit.  Does our argument show that application of PP in such
“single-case” circumstances is justified?  Assuming, as always, that we have no inadmissible
information regarding this upcoming single case, the answer is “yes, it does.”  Our argument
shows that setting our level of credence in A to the objective chance is a “winning” strategy
most of the time when guessing many outcomes is undertaken.  But setting our credence for
outcome A equal to a constant, x, over a series of n trials is the same thing as setting our
credence equal to x for each individual trial in the collection.  It cannot be the case that the
former is reasonable and justified, but the latter – its identical sub-components – is
unreasonable or unjustified.  Just as two wrongs do not make a right, concatenating
unreasonable acts does not somehow make a composite act that is reasonable.  So when we
have to set our credence - make a bet, in other words - on a single case, the prescription of PP
remains valid and justified, even though that justification is, so to speak, inherited from the
fact that the PP-recommended credences are guaranteed to be winners most of the time, over
medium-run sets of “trials”.  
Suppose the contrary.  That is, suppose that we think it is possible that over decent-
sized numbers of trials using PP is justified, but nevertheless in certain specific single cases –
say, your very next coin flip – it may in fact not be justified.  What could make this be the
case?  Well, you might think that some specific local factors exist that make a higher-than-0.5
credence in Heads reasonable.  Perhaps you have put the coin heads-up on your thumb, and as
it happens, your coin flips tend to turn over an even number of times, so that flips starting
heads-up (tails-up) land heads (tails) more often than 50% of the time.  What this amounts to,
of course, is postulating that your coin flips in fact comprise a different SNM than ordinary
coin flipping devices (including persons) – condition 5 in our earlier description of the fair
coin flipping SNM is violated by these assumptions.  Nevertheless, let’s assume for the
moment that the 50/50 chance of heads and tails on coin flippings is in fact a proper part of
the Best System, and that your flips do fall under the 50/50 regularity (perhaps the Best
System is content with a looser specification of the coin-flip setup).  By our assumptions,
your flips also satisfy the conditions for a less common SNM.  Now there are two cases to
consider: first, that we (who have to set our credences in your next flip) know about this
further objective chance; second, that we don’t.  
If we do know about it, then the case is parallel to the breast cancer example above. 
29And as we will see in the next section, it is possible for the more generic, macro-
chance to trump the more specific, micro-based chance.
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Knowing the higher-than-50% chance for your flips when they start heads-up, and seeing that
indeed you are about to flip the coin starting from that position, we should set our credences
to the higher level.  The rules of admissibility tell us that the ordinary 50/50 chances are
inapplicable here, but the chances arising from the more constrained SNM that your flips
instantiate are OK.  This does nothing, of course, to undercut the reasonableness of PP in
ordinary applications to a single case, when such trumping information is not available. 
Chance is a guide to life when you can’t find a better one, and has never aspired to anything
higher!
If we do not know about it, then the question becomes: is setting our credence to 0.5
as PP recommends reasonable?  It might seem that the answer is negative, because the “real”
probability of heads on that next flip is in fact higher.  But as Humeans about chance, we
know that this way of thinking is a mistake.  Both objective chances are “real”; the fact that
sometimes one trumps the other does not make it more real.29  An application of PP is not
made unreasonable just because there is a better way of guiding credence out there; it only
becomes unreasonable if that better way comes to the chance user’s attention, and when that
happens, the original chance can no longer be plugged into PP because of the violation of
admissibility.  
Few- and no-case chances
The Best System aspect of Humean chance takes us away from a (sophisticated) actual
frequentism in two ways: by “smoothing out and rounding off” the chances and chance laws,
and by using higher-level and lower-level regularities to extend the domain of objective
chances to cover setups that have few, or no, instances in actual history (like our 43-slot
roulette wheel).  The former aspect makes objective chances easier to discover and to work
with than pure finite frequencies, which is all to the good in a concept, such as the concept of
objective chance, whose nature is bound up with its utility to finite rational agents.  Since it
never drags the objective chance far away from the frequencies, when the numbers of actual
instances of the setup in history are large, it is not problematic vis a vis the deduction of PP. 
But the latter aspect may well look problematic.  For we know that if the number of actual
instances of setup S in all history is relatively small, then the actual frequency is may well be
quite far from the objective chance dictated by the higher-level pattern.  Perhaps 00 lands in
30Undermining is explained in section 6.
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one twenty-fifth of the times (say, only a few hundred) that our 43-slot roulette wheel is spun,
rather than something close to one forty-third.  In cases such as this, how can PP be
justifiable?  
Notice that in cases like this, where the numbers over all history are relatively low, we
cannot mount an argument similar to our basic argument for PP above, but now in favor of a
rule of setting credence equal to the actual frequency.  Why not?  Because there is no
guarantee that there will be the sort of uniformity over subsets of n trials that we knew we
could appeal to when the numbers are large or infinite.  Suppose our 43-slot roulette wheel
was spun a total of 800 times, and 00 came up 32 times.  Considering now guesses as to the
number of 00 outcomes in “short run” sets of n = 50 consecutive spins, can we assert with
confidence that in most of these runs, a guess of 2/50 will be closer to the actual frequency
more often than a guess of 1/43?   By no means.  It may happen that the actual pattern of
outcomes is very much as one would expect based on the objective chance of 1/43, but in the
last 90 spins 00 turns up a surprising 12 times. These things happen, and given the low overall
numbers, cannot be considered undermining outcomes for the objective chance of 1/43.30  But
if this is how the 00 outcomes are distributed, then a person betting on a subset of 50
consecutive spins will do better to bet with the objective chance, most of the time (just not in
the last 100 spins!).  Neither a credence level of 1/25 nor one of 1/43 is guaranteed to be a
winner in most of the short run guessing games that might be extracted from the total 800
spins.
It is true, of course, that if we consider all the possible ways of selecting sets of 50
outcomes for our guessing games – not just consecutive spins, but even-numbered spins,
“randomly” chosen sets, etc. – then the frequency of 1/25 is going to do better, overall, in this
wider set of games.  (The reason is that in the vast range of games where the 50-trial subsets
are chosen “randomly”, the frequency in such subsets will most often be close to 1/25 rather
than 1/43.)  But it remains true that a consequentialist argument for setting credence equal to
the actual frequency rather than the HOC is much weaker here than is the argument for using
HOCs in the standard case of setups with very many outcomes.  And we should remember
that if the divergence is too serious, and the number of outcomes at issue large enough, the
Best System will have to go with the frequency rather than the symmetry-derived chance: we
have frequency-deviation tolerance, but only within limits! 
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The credence level of 1/25 is guaranteed to beat that of 1/43, of course, in the limit as
the “short” run over which we are guessing approaches, and finally equals, the total set of 800
actual spins.  But applying PP to set credences for sets of outcomes that are a significant part
of – or equal to – the total set of actual outcomes is extending the notion of objective chance
beyond the bounds of its legitimate application.  Objective chance is a guide to life when one
has to guess at the outcomes of objective chance events in a small fragment of the overall
mosaic on which the chance supervenes.  This is the proper lesson of the undermining
contradiction problem (see section 6.1).  For now, we can consider the loophole closed off by
noting that when objective chance and actual frequency do diverge significantly, (a) neither
one is guaranteed to beat the other as a credence-setting strategy for short runs, and (b) any
disadvantage that accrues to setting one’s credences via PP rather than according to the actual
frequencies will be limited in size.
5.2   Other accounts and PP
Whatever the difficulties or limitations of our deduction of PP may be, it should be apparent
already that the standard competing accounts of objective chance cannot offer anything even
remotely similar.  The traditional hypothetical frequentist adopts a position that utterly
disconnects the objective chances from frequencies (and even from random-lookingness) in
finite initial subsequences, so she cannot mount an argument for the rationality of PP based
on it’s guaranteeing a winning strategy most of the time (for us, in finite human history). 
Instead she will be forced to go second-order and say that adopting PP will yield winning
strategies with high probability, this probability being an objective one derived from the first-
order objective chances themselves. But even if we grant her this second-order objective
probability, the question remains: why should I believe that adapting my credences to the
objective chances is a likely-winning strategy, just because this proposition has a high
objective chance in the hypothetical frequentist’s sense?  Evidently, I am being asked to apply
PP to her second-order chances, in order to establish that PP is justified for her first-order
chances . . . a glaring circularity.  Moreover, if I reflect on the literal meaning of these second
order chances, they direct me to contemplate the limiting frequency of cases (worlds?) in
which applying PP to the first-order chances is a winning strategy, in a hypothetical infinite
sequence of “trial-worlds”.  The metaphysics begins to look excessive, and in any case we
31I should note that Howson and Urbach (1993) offer an ingenious non-
consequentialist defense of PP in the context of Von Mises’ version of hypothetical
frequentism that is, so far as I can see, successful.  What the argument shows is that if you
consider objective chances to be the frequencies in hypothetical von Mises collectives
generated from the chance setup, and believe the chance of outcome A is p, then it is
incoherent to set one’s degree of belief concerning the next outcome’s being A to any value
other than p.  This justification of PP is in one sense stronger than mine for HOC, since it
shows setting one’s credences differently to be incoherent, not just likely to bring about
unfortunate results. In another sense, the justification is weaker, and for precisely the same
reason: It shows that violating PP is incoherent, but not that it is a strategy likely to bring
unfortunate results in our world.  
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immediately see that the problem reappears at the second level, so that we need a third-order
argument to justify PP for the second-order chances . . .  And so on.  Infinity turns out to be
an unhappy place to mount a consequentialist argument for PP.31
The metaphysical propensity theorist, by contrast, does not offer a definition of
objective chances at all, and so exposes himself to less risk.  The boldest version of this
position in recent times appears in Hall (2004).  
Let’s recall the full force of Lewis’ challenge to the advocate of metaphysical
propensities:
“Be my guest – posit all the primitive unHumean whatnots you like.  (I only
ask that your alleged truths should supervene on being).  But play fair in
naming your whatnots.  Don’t call any alleged feature of reality ‘chance’
unless you’ve already shown that you have something, knowledge of which
could constrain rational credence.” (1994, p. 484).
Answering Lewis’ challenge to the advocate of metaphysical whatnots, Hall writes:
“What I ‘have’ are objective chances, which, I assert, are simply an extra
ingredient of metaphysical reality, not to be ‘reduced’ to anything else.  What’s
more, it is just a basic conceptual truth about chance that it is the sort of thing,
knowledge of which constrains rational credence.  Of course, it is a further
question – one that certainly cannot be answered definitively from the
armchair – whether nature provides anything that answers to our concept of
chance.  But we have long since learned to live with such modest sceptical
worries.  And at any rate, they are irrelevant to the question at issue, which is
32Hall goes on to suggest that perhaps the primitivist will be able to argue that the
reasonableness of PP follows from constraints on reasonable initial credence functions that
are connected to “categorical” features of the world.  But although Hall speaks of these
constraints as if they were “imposed by” categorical facts (p. 107), in fact the constraints he
has in mind are just rules about how to distribute credence in light of the presence or absence
of certain categorical features of things. (E.g., Hall suggests the constraints might include “. . .
various indifference principles, carefully qualified so as to avoid inconsistency.”) He goes on
to postulate a situation in which exchangeability works as a “categorical constraint”, allowing
a hypothetical frequentist to derive the appropriate local application of PP.  The problem of
course is that exchangeability is by no means imposed by categorical facts in the world, and
Hall’s application of it here is in reality just a disguised application of PP itself.  Why should
my credences satisfy exchangeability? Because I believe there is a unique, stable objective
chance for each trial, and I want my credences to match it. . ..
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whether my primitivist position can ‘rationalize’ the Principal Principle.  The
answer, manifestly, is that it can: for, again, it is part of my position that this
principle states an analytic truth about chance and rational credence.” (2004, p.
106).
The problem with this move is that assertion is not argument.  If one postulates a
metaphysical whatnot (calling it an “ingredient” doesn’t help), insists that it is irreducible to
anything else and indeed that the actual history of occurrent events places no constraints on
what these whatnots might be (numerically), then it is bold indeed to assert that these
unknowable whatnots ought to constrain my degrees of belief, else I am irrational. (Notice
also that Hall is deliberately declining to “play fair” in Lewis’ terms, boldly calling his
whatnots ‘chances’ without showing anything at all about them.)
 Fortunately, a position such as this writes itself completely off the map as far as real-
world endeavors are concerned.  Until the primitivist can overcome the “modest” skeptical
worry that, perhaps, there are no objective chances in our world after all – and for Hall, as for
Mellor (1995), Lewis (1994) and others, this means proving determinism false – and then
offer some epistemological hints about how to infer the values of the whatnots, scientists and
statisticians can safely ignore him.  They may as well help themselves to my Humean
objective chances, whose existence is guaranteed and which can be learned by ordinary
scientific practices.32
Finally, let’s consider Sober’s (2005) no-theory theory of chance.  It has the great
virtue, compared to metaphysical propensities and hypothetical frequentism, of letting us be
sure that the chances exist and are nontrivial, because the chances just are whatever our
accepted scientific theories say they are.  It also beats the other two competitors when it
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comes to justifying PP.  Whereas they can give, in the end, no justification of the
reasonableness of PP at all, Sober can appeal to our successes in using objective probabilities
as inductive evidence that applying PP is a good strategy.  
Or rather, Sober can help himself to such inductive support in sciences where the
chances are not inferred from statistics, but rather grounded a prioristically in theory (i.e., in
QM and statistical mechanics).  It is widely recognized that the standard procedures of
inferring objective probabilities from statistical evidence use PP – that is, their claim to
methodological soundness rests on assuming that the objective chances being guessed at
deserve to govern credence.  Where PP needs to be assumed in arriving at the (estimated)
chances, it would seem to be circular to claim that the success of the sciences using said
chances argues for the validity of PP as applied to chances in that science. This caveat
drastically reduces the range of objective probabilities for which the no-theory theory can
claim an inductive grounding for PP.
So the no-theory theory is a clear improvement over the more traditional theories, but
only enjoys this advantage in sciences where chances are derived from pure theory.
6.  The Limitations of Chance 
6.1 Undermining
Undermining is a feature of Humean chances: the objective probabilities supervening
on the Humean mosaic may entail that certain sorts of “unlikely” large-scale future events
have a non-zero objective chance, even though were said events to have occurred, then the
Humean mosaic would have been so different that the objective chances themselves would
have been different. The problem gets elevated to the status of a contradiction as follows:  If F
is our undermining future, then PP says 
C(F|HtwTw) = x = Pr(F),  x > 0, where Pr is the objective chance function given by Tw.
But (the story goes) F plus Htw jointly entail, under the Humean analysis of chance, ¬Tw.  So
the standard axioms of probability tell you that  C(F|HtwTw) = 0.   Never mind that the
difference between x and zero will be just about zero, in any realistic case; never mind that
neither Htw nor Tw can ever really be known by us, and so forth: a contradiction is a
contradiction, and is bad news. 
33Dupré (1993) calls this “causal completeness” in the probabilistic sense.  The non-
probabilistic version of causal completeness is determinism.
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Most papers on Humean chance since 1994 have been largely devoted to the
undermining problem: arguing that it is solvable, or unsolvable, or was never a problem to
begin with.  There are too many turns and twists to the story to enter into it here.  My view is
that the contradiction problem is real, though much harder to generate than Lewis originally
thought; no application of HOC that beings like us would ever undertake can have
undermining potential.  And as I argued in (1997), the solution to the problem is basically to
ignore it.  
Recall that the deduction of PP relies on the scenario of using chances to predict
outcomes over small-to-medium sized sets of events.  Since PP is essential to chance, the
limitations on its validity are likewise limitations on the proper scope of applicability of HOC.
It is a mistake – a misunderstanding of the nature of objective chance – to contemplate using
the OC’s for setting credences concerning fragments of the Humean mosaic big enough to
have undermining potential.  Humean chance is by its very nature a notion whose range of
correct application must be limited.
6.2 A Chance for all Setups?  
HOC may be limited in another way as well.  Let’s suppose for the moment that the
Best System gives chances for micro-level events – complete chances, in the sense that for a
completely-specified initial physical state of affairs, the Best System entails the chances for
all physically possible future evolutions of the physical states of affairs.33   Then if we
suppose also a strong enough reductive supervenience thesis (all possible macroscopic states
of affairs being equivalent to disjunctions of micro-physically specified states of affairs), then
a question arises concerning the Best System’s chances.  The System may have, we said, an
objective chance of the 09:37 train arriving on time on an ordinary weekday. And this chance
supervenes simply on the pattern of facts about train arrival times.  But our causally complete
micro-chances may also entail a value for this objective chance; presumably time-variable,
presumably often close to the macro-derived chance, but nonetheless different.  Two
questions arise from this scenario.  First, does this scenario make the Best System self-
contradictory?  And second, if we could somehow know both objective chances, which one
would better deserve to guide our credences?
The answer to the first question is negative.  All OC’s are referred to a chance setup,
34It may be that our two posited chances are such that admissibility considerations rule
out the use of one, if the other is known, as we saw in the breast cancer case.  But it is not
clear to me that this must happen in general.
35It’s important to bear in mind that we can never come to know the micro-derived
chance, and can only do our best to guess at the existence and value of a macro-derived
chance.  So the competition we are discussing is purely hypothetical: God whispers in one ear
the macro-level chance, based on the entire history of 09:37 trains, while a Laplacean demon
who calculates the micro-derived chance whispers it in your other ear.  Which to use?
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and the micro-derived, time-variable chances of lateness for the 9:37 have a different chance
setup every morning, while the macro-derived chance’s setup is relatively permanent.  So the
two competing chances do not overtly contradict each other, any more than the two breast
cancer chances discussed earlier.34
But they are still competitors.35  Which one wins?  Common wisdom among
philosophers of science suggests that it must be the micro-derived chance.  It is, we might
think, the chance that is grounded on more complete knowledge, hence favored under the
Principal of Total Evidence (see Sober (2004)).  But on the contrary, I want to suggest that it
could be the macro-derived chance that better deserves to guide credence.  How could this
be?  
First, we’ll suppose that the micro-derived chance, though time-variable, is still fairly
stable from morning to morning.  (We’ll suppose we are given information about the chance
of lateness as of 06:00 each morning, and that it generally hovers around 0.3 except when the
network has a serious breakdown.)  But the macro-derived chance – in a case like this,
essentially the frequency – might be significantly different (say, 0.15).  How could this be? 
Well, nothing rules it out.  The micro-level chances are what they are because they best
systematize the patterns of outcomes of micro-level chance setups, such as quantum state
transitions.  And they may do this excellently well, at all times and places in world history. 
But that entails nothing about what will happen for train arrivals.  The micro-theory of
chances in the Best System gets the frequencies right for micro-level events (and reasonable-
sized conjunctions and disjunctions of them), to a good approximation, over the entire
mosaic.  This simply does not entail that the micro-theory must get the frequencies right for
sets of distinct one-off setups, each being a horribly complex conjunction of micro-events,
from which a chance is calculated for an even more horribly complex disjunction of
conjunctions of micro-events, all confined to a small fragment of the Humean mosaic.
To properly characterize the scenario and demonstrate more rigorously that nothing
36The same goes for Humean laws, of course, pace Lewis.  The traditional empiricist
response to this awkward point is to offer a revised account of explanation – one based on
deduction, for example, or systematization/unification.  In these weakened senses of
explanation, Humean chances may also be able to lay claim to explanatory power.
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guarantees that the micro-derived chances will be close to the macro-derived chances (and
hence, to the frequencies) would require many pages of discussion.  I hope the basic point is
clear enough: Humean micro-level chances are guaranteed to be good guides to credence for
micro-level events, but not necessarily for macro-level events.  If a significant divergence
were to occur, then our argument in section 5 shows that the macro-derived chances would be
the ones deserving to guide our credences.  Contrary to many philosophers’ intuitions, the
micro-level does not automatically dominate over the macro.
Chances are nothing but aspects of the patterns in world history.  There are chance-
making patterns at various ontological levels.  Nothing makes the patterns at one level
automatically dominate over those at another; at whatever level, the chances that can best play
the PP role are those that count as the “real” objective probabilities.  In this section we have
seen that the constraint of being able to play the PP role puts limitations on the scope of
proper uses of objective probabilities.  
7.   Conclusion
The view of chance on offer is perhaps the only interpretation of chance (besides actual
frequency) able to demonstrate the reasonability of PP, and due to its Best System character it
has a number of virtues not possessed by actual frequentism: ability to respect symmetries and
to extend to cover setups with few or no actual instances; and the epistemic advantage of
being ideally discoverable by finite agents using only ordinary inductive methods.
 By way of closing, I want to return briefly to the topic of chances as explainers of events.  By
their very nature, Humean chances are not explainers of events, but rather a product of the
events themselves – which are thus logically prior.36  To some extent the existence of SNM’s
lets us give a non-trivial explanation of events (e.g., that approximately 50% of the coins
landed heads in a 1000-flip experiment); but the explanation is grounded on the random-
looking distribution of facts at a more micro-level, and that has no explanation based on
chance.  This may be the great defect of the view to those attracted by propensities.  If you
have metaphysical yearnings that Humean chances just cannot satisfy, then you are welcome
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to postulate all the “metaphysical whatnots” you like; and I wish you luck in trying to
demonstrate that they exist, or that we can find out their strengths if they do exist, or that they
deserve to play the PP role in guiding belief.   Humean chances exist whether or not there are
such Popperian propensities or Hallian primitive chances in the world.  If such whatnots do
exist, that is nice I suppose; but by their very nature, the Humean chances are apt for playing
the PP role, and so deserve the title of “the objective chances”.  Capacities and propensities
may explain why the chances are what they are (though I personally have difficulty seeing
such explanations as anything more than ‘dormative virtues’) – but that does not make them
the chances.  And of course, if there are no such things, the Humean chances are still as I have
described them (and they have a different explanation, or none at all – a question for another
day). 
Since scientists and policymakers do postulate objective probabilities, and try to find out what
they are – often with apparent success – philosophers of science should not be content with
anything less than a theory of objective chances that entails that they exist, that we can come
to know them, and that they deserve to guide action under circumstances of ignorance. 
Humean objective chance, as I have sketched it, is the only genuine theory of chance that can
meet these goals.  
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